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SOCIAL GEOGRAPHY 
 
 
 
The European migration crisis has divided 
the population of Germany along the lines of 
the country’s migration policy and the attitude 
to immigrants. The anti-immigrant sentiment, 
supported by the rhetoric of the extreme right-
wing parties and the criticism of current poli-
cies, have been growing in the society. This 
article reviews theoretical approaches to the 
study of public attitude to migrants proceeding 
from the effect that immigration has on the 
socioeconomic development of the host socie-
ty. The authors propose a mechanism for ana-
lysing the political life of a society to develop 
viable approaches to managing the migration 
shock and mitigating its effect. The article 
considers the attitudes of the German popula-
tion to immigration and immigrants in terms 
of the transformation of electoral preferences 
under the influence of the migration crisis. 
Recent data on the electoral standing of the 
Alternative for Germany party are used to de-
velop a typology of states, based on the level 
of support for this party from the local popula-
tion and on other measures of the migration 
situation and socioeconomic development. The 
authors identify northeastern regions with a 
high probability of popular support for the 
extreme right views on the migration crisis 
and northern and southwestern states that are 
most and least susceptible to the extreme right 
influence. 
 
Key words: migration crisis in Germany, 
Alternative for Germany, attitudes to immigra-
tion, public opinion, territorial differences of 
German states 
 
Theory 
 
Examining the attitudes of a recipient 
society to immigrants is an integral part of 
most studies into migration policies and 
efficient immigration management. The 
attitudes of recipient societies towards 
immigrants and refugees are often studied 
from the perspective of cultural distance 
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and identity problems, economic concerns and security threats, integration 
and assimilation problems, etc. Two areas of research have developed in this 
field [2]. The first one focuses on the attitudes to immigration from the per-
spective of personal, mainly economic, consequences for an individual [3; 4; 
5]. Reception of immigrants has a significant effect on socioeconomic de-
velopment, namely, the labour market and living standards, regional produc-
tion and consumption, public sector and social relations, international trade, 
and technological development [6]. A substantial body of research [7; 8] 
suggests that negative attitudes towards migrants are often attributed to the 
expectations of unemployment, lower wages, higher taxes, and reductions in 
public spending as a result of the inflow of foreign labour force [3; 7; 8; 9]. 
However, recent studies show that the key factor affecting attitudes to immi-
gration is the conviction an individual has about the cultural/symbolical (na-
tional identity) or economic threat to their home region or country [2; 10; 
11]. This social-psychological approach lies at the core of the second type of 
studies into attitudes towards immigration. Recent findings suggest that de-
mands for a tougher immigration policy are associated with major economic 
shocks and crises. Otherwise, they are characteristic of individuals with neg-
ative stereotypes about members of other ethnic groups [2; 13; 14]. Most 
works in the field analyse the surveys asking respondents about what levels 
of immigration they deem preferable, whether there is a need to curb immi-
gration, etc. However, such an approach suggests studying only the ex-
pressed but not actual attitudes to immigration [15]. Moreover, it is pre-
sumed that respondents are familiar with the problem of migration. Voiced 
attitudes are often divorced from the actual migration situation. 
Studies focusing on analysing attitudes to immigration and their correla-
tion with electoral preferences and relevant legislative initiatives have been 
gaining in popularity of late. Highly instrumental in estimating the effect of 
immigration on the political scenery, these studies are in high demand today. 
The government’s position on migration is an important political issue. The 
European migrant crisis has shown that immigration can have a destructive 
effect on established political alliances and on the agenda of individual activ-
ists and elites, and can disturb the balance of power. As a result, unexpected 
coalitions may emerge [2]. 
The mechanism governing the effect of migration shock on a society’s 
political sphere can be described as a process of direct and indirect influence 
on different areas of life (fig. 1). For instance, a mass inflow of migrants 
who do not enjoy voting rights does not have a direct effect on the political 
life of the recipient society; however, the very presence of migrants influ-
ences opinions in it. The migration shock affects primarily the spheres of 
direct contact with immigrants — social, economic, and sociocultural (spir-
itual) ones. This effect determines the response of the ‘population’ subsys-
tem to the migrant crisis. The population elects certain members of elites, 
expecting them to make changes to the political sphere to adjust the state’s 
immigration and/or foreign policy. However, the political sphere (elites) may 
affect the public opinion on migration both negatively and positively [16; 
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17]. For instance, political parties and leaders may propagate intolerant and 
even racist slogans — which is the case in Hungary — or even declare im-
migration a threat to national security [15]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Direct and indirect effects of migration shock on the major systems  
of a recipient society 
 
Source: compiled by the authors. 
 
A vast body of research has been carried out in this area. Most studies 
focus on migration laws and the political sphere of recipient societies [15]. 
Of special interest are extreme right parties, migratory regulation being a 
central theme of their election campaigns [18]. Today, amid the migrant crisis, 
the right movement is gaining in popularity in many European countries — 
Germany, Hungary, and others [19; 20]. For instance, Matt Golder concludes 
that one of the reasons behind the popularity of extreme right parties is the 
growing anti-immigrant sentiment in society — a result of concern over in-
creasing unemployment and threats to national identity and culture among 
the recipient population [21]. Analysing an econometric simulation of the 
effect of increasing proportion of immigrant population and growing unem-
ployment on the number of votes cast for extreme right parties in Germany, 
France, and Austria in 1960—1999, Terri Givens concludes that a 1 % in-
crease in the proportion of foreigners translates into a 0.7—0.8 % rise in the 
popularity of such parties. In Germany, this effect was not pronounced [21]. 
However, one can assume that there is certain indirect influence. Voters in 
the regions with a small proportion of immigrants can vote for the extreme 
right out of concern about a possible inflow of migrants. For instance, the 
data compiled by the TARKI group show that, during the migrant crisis in 
Hungary, people who had never spoken to migrants or refugees had the most 
negative opinion about them [22]. Current Russian studies into the de-
velopment of Germany’s political party system under the impact of continu-
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ing inflow of refugees demonstrate increasing popularity of extreme left par-
ties, which take advantage of anti-immigrant sentiment of part the electorate 
[20; 23; 24]. 
The current study focuses on attitudes to immigration and immigrants. 
However, it is proposed to consider such attitudes from the perspective of 
transformations in the electoral preferences of the population under the im-
pact of migration shock as a manifestation of the recipient society’s views on 
immigration. Moreover, the authors strive to fill in the gap in geography-
based studies and to provide a typology of German states by the occurrence 
of extreme right views on immigration among the recipient population. This 
will be done through estimating the electoral popularity of the Alternative 
for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland, the AfD) party. The article will 
also describe the migration situation and socioeconomic conditions in each 
region. 
 
Methodology 
 
This study analyses data on the electoral standing of the AfD party, 
based on the results of recent surveys (September 2016 — February 2017) 
conducted by German public opinion research organisations — Infratest di-
map, INSA, the University of Hamburg, and Forsa. 
A typology was constructed to identify patterns in the formation of atti-
tudes to the current migration shock, broken down by Germany’s federal 
states. One of the key classification properties was regional support for the 
AfD estimated with the help of the data on the proportion of votes for the 
party, and the number of seats it holds in a Landtag. Secondary, or contextu-
al, criteria were the commonly used measures of regional migration situation 
and socioeconomic development — the proportion of foreign-born residents 
(percent of the total population), concentration of asylum seekers (number of 
first-time asylum applications per 1,000 population), asylum seeker quota, 
gross regional product (thousand euro at basic prices, GRP), and unemploy-
ment rate [25]. 
 
Germany’s migrant crisis in figures 
 
The notion of migrant crisis does not have a precise definition in interna-
tional law. A relatively new term to the international political community, it 
sparks off heated debates on ‘crisis-driven’, i. e. forced migration. The ‘mi-
gration’ crisis is yet another proof. Experts on migration believe that, in a 
broad sense, the migrant crisis is the movement of people forced to migrate 
by threats to their lives posed by changes in living conditions [26]. Key con-
cepts of forced migration were outlined in the 1951 Refugee Convention. 
The refugee is a person ‘who owing to a well-founded fear of being perse-
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cuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular 
social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and 
is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protec-
tion of that country’ [27]. The Collins dictionary gives this definition of a 
migrant crisis: ‘increasing numbers of migrant arrivals which is a combina-
tion of refugees and economic migrants’ [28]. Today’s migrant crisis in Eu-
rope and in Germany demonstrates that economic migrants can pass as 
forced migrants, i. e. migration may be voluntary. Here, the term refugee will 
not apply. A more appropriate term is asylum seeker: ‘a person who is seek-
ing protection as a refugee and is still waiting to have his/her claim as-
sessed’. This article will discuss the migrant crisis with a particular focus on 
asylum seekers. 
Experts date the beginning of Germany’s migrant crisis differently. Ac-
cording to official statistics on arrivals and registrations in the EASY sys-
tem, a steep increase in the number of immigrants was observed in June 
2015. In the three summer months, the monthly migrant inflow was 3.2 
times that of 2014 and the first five months of 2015 (fig. 2). The inflow of 
migrants hit its peak in November 2015 to reach 206.1 people. However, the 
number of asylum seekers calculated based on first-time applications was 
rising as early as the first months of 2015 (fig. 2). 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. The number of asylum seekers, persons registered with the EASY system,  
and asylum applicants 
 
Source: [29—32]. 
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Germany’s population started to react to the increasing inflow of mi-
grants when the first signs of the imminent migrant crisis became visible. 
Survey data suggest that the problem of migration and integration came to 
the fore as early as September 2014, shadowing such major issues as unem-
ployment and pensions (fig. 3). The first steep monthly increase in the num-
ber of asylum seekers — by 30—40 % — was observed in September-
October 2014. However, this growth was just a ‘ripple’ in comparison to the 
‘surge’ that came in summer-autumn 2015 (fig. 2). By the end of 2015, 80 % 
of the local population were concerned about the migrant crisis and its con-
sequences. 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Germany’s most important problems, according to the country’s population 
 
Source: [33]. 
 
Thus, from the end of 2014, Germany has been experiencing the largest 
inflow of forced migrants since the 1990s. According to the Federal Office 
for Migration and Refugees, over 1 m people entered the country and regis-
tered with the EASY (Erstverteilung der Asylbegehrenden, First distribution 
of asylum seekers) system. This number was 3.5 times that of the previous 
year. However, not even half applied for asylum. This is explained as fol-
lows. Firstly, some migrants could be double-registered because of flaws in 
the EASY system. Secondly, many migrants were not accounted for by the 
end of the year, since an average period between applying for and receiving 
asylum took 5.3 months. Therefore, such migrants had to be accounted for 
next year [34]. The latter argument is supported by the 2015 statistics — the 
number of immigrants who had applied for asylum was twice that of immi-
grants who had entered the country (fig. 4). 
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Fig. 4. The number of persons seeking asylum in Germany,  
registered with the EASY system, and applicants for asylum in 2014—2016, persons 
 
Source: [29—32]. 
 
As the monthly immigration rate started to decrease at the end of 2015 
(according to the number of migrants registered with EASY), public concern 
over migration, integration, and refugees lessened. However, persistently 
high numbers of asylum seekers, despite a significant decrease in the number 
of arrivals, will remain a major concern for Germany’s population. 
However, the large inflow of migrants has to be distributed evenly across 
the country. To that end, the Königstein quota (Königsteiner Schlüssel) sys-
tem is used. It distributes asylum seekers based on the population of a state 
(which counts for one third of the quota) and regional tax revenues (two 
thirds). According to 2015 quotas, three regions — Bavaria, Baden-Würt-
temberg, and North Rhine-Westphalia — accounted for half of all asylum 
seekers (fig. 5). Nevertheless, these states do not stand out in terms of mi-
grant concentration. According to 2015 statistics, the heaviest migrant load 
is carried by the northeastern states — Mecklenburg-West Pomerania, Saxo-
ny-Anhalt, and Brandenburg — and the city-states of Berlin, Bremen, and 
Hamburg. In 2015, high concentration of immigrants is observed in the Saar 
with 10 asylum seekers per 1,000 population. The concentration of migrants 
registered with the EASY system in 2015 was even higher and it exceeded 
20 persons per 1,000 population in Mecklenburg-West Pomerania, the Saar, 
and Berlin. 
The migrant crisis, regardless of its causes, is having a dramatic effect on 
the public consciousness of the receiving society. Since 2015, surveys have 
shown that, for most Germans, negatives outweigh positives when it comes 
to immigration [36]. At different points, 33—44 % of the population shared 
this opinion. A further 14—18 % of the population believe that immigration 
has both negative and positive consequences [36]. For a long time, Germany 
has been one of five European countries, where a vast majority of population 
(over 60 %) associate terrorism with migrants [37]. The proportion of Ger-
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mans who are afraid of large numbers of incoming refugees, terrorist attacks, 
and a growing crime rate is increasing. Their share rose from 45 % at the be-
ginning of 2014 to 77 % in July 215 [36; 38]. After a slight reduction, it 
reached 62 % after the terrorist attack at the Christmas market in Berlin in 
December 2016 [36]. Discontent among the population is explained by vari-
ous reasons: a lack of public confidence in the integration of such a large 
number of migrants with different religious and social backgrounds, fears 
about increasing crime rates, and disappointment in the state’s migration and 
integration policy, including the inability to curb the number of incoming hu-
manitarian migrants. Other reasons include concerns over changes in one’s 
own socioeconomic position following an increase in expenditure on refugee 
distribution and growing competition in the labour market, etc. [39—40]. 
 
 
 
Fig. 5. Key measure of asylum seeker distribution,  
broken down by federal states, 2015 
 
Source: compiled by the authors based on [35]. 
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German attitudes to the migrant crisis 
 
Such public perception of the migrant crisis resulted in dwindling sup-
port for the immigration policy pursued by the government headed by Mrs 
Angela Merkel. Recent surveys show that 52 % of Germans were satisfied 
with the chancellor’s policies, whereas in October 2014, this figure stood at 
70 % [36]. 
Thus, in anticipation of the 2017 election campaign, a number of political 
parties espoused an anti-immigrant rhetoric and the extreme right parties — 
fervent supporters of restrictive immigration policies — reinforced it. The 
greatest success was a young radical party — the Alternative for Germany 
(the AfD). It calls for introducing a selective immigration policy, restricting 
the number of humanitarian migrants, abandoning the Schengen agreement, 
re-establishing control along the country’s border, and limiting income bene-
fits for the refugees to the standards of their home countries. Strange as it 
may seem, these simple mottos repudiating the policies pursued by the ruling 
coalition are embraced by many Germans today. At the same time, the AfD 
party ‘feeds’ on the support of the most radical part of the population. The 
number of crimes against immigrants and volunteers helping them has in-
creased of late. 
Recent surveys show that the AfD enjoys 13 % support as compared to 
6 % in November 2014 (fig. 6). 
 
 
 
Fig. 6. The electoral standing of Germany’s political parties in 2014—2016 
 
Comment: CDU stands for Christian Democratic Union of Germany (Christlich 
Demokratische Union Deutschlands), CSU for Christian Social Union in Bavaria 
(Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern), SPD for Social Democratic Party of Germany 
(Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands), FDP for Free Democratic Party (Freie 
Demokratische Partei), Piraten for Pirate Party Germany (Piratenpartei Deutsch-
land), and the AfD for Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland). 
Source: [41]. 
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The AfD supporters are not distributed evenly across the country. When 
it comes to support for the party, there are regional differences along socio-
economic and geographical lines (fig. 7). 
This study shows that Germany’s sixteen states can be divided into three 
subgroups (A, B, C) as regards their support for extreme right views on the 
migrant crisis (fig. 7; table). 
 
 
 
Fig. 7. Types of Germany’s federal states by the electoral standing of the AfD,  
migration situation, and socioeconomic development, 2015—2017 
 
Comments: the map uses the results of surveys held on September 15, 2016 in 
Baden-Württemberg; January 11, 2017 in Bavaria; February 27, 2017 in Berlin; 
January 18, 2017 in Brandenburg; January 19, 2017 in Bremen; October 24, 2016 in 
Hamburg; January 12, 2017 in Hessen; January 19, 2017 in Mecklenburg-West 
Pomerania; January 20, 2017 in Lower Saxony; February 19, 2017 in North Rhine-
Westphalia; December 15, 2016 in Rhineland-Palatinate; January 26, 2017 in the 
Saar; October 22, 2016 in Saxony; October 22, 2016 in Saxony-Anhalt; Decem-
ber 9, 2016 in Schleswig-Holstein; and December 2, 2016 in Thuringia. 
Source: compiled by the authors. 
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Type A is characterised by a high probability of support for extreme 
right views on the migrant crisis. It brings together the regions where the 
support for the AfD exceeds 18.0 %, the party being second or third largest 
in the Landtag. The proportion of foreign-born population is rather low, 
which may be explained by a low asylum seeker quota. The concentrations 
of immigrants increased three or fourfold in such regions in 2015 as com-
pared to 2014, which reinforced the anti-migrant sentiment and secured addi-
tional support for the restrictive immigration policy promoted by the AfD. 
Moreover, these regions are the poorest states of Germany with a GRP 22 % be-
low the national average and lower (as of 2015, the average level was 32.2 thou-
sand euro) and an unemployment rate reaching up to 40 %. These are the former 
GDR states situated in the country’s north-east. Historically, local residents 
have demonstrated negative rather than positive attitudes towards the coun-
try’s open immigration policy. There are A1 and A2 subtypes, which differ 
in the expression of these characteristics. 
Type B. The population of these states is less prone to supporting anti-
migration views of the AfD party. However, the influence of the party is 
strong. Its support ranges between 5 to 10 % across the group and is likely to 
grow. The proportion of foreigners in these regions is rather high. There are 
established ethnic groups, most residents are accustomed to ethnic diversity, 
and they are tolerant of immigrants, whom they consider part of the commu-
nity. At the same time, a significant increase in the number of asylum seek-
ers (3.9-fold in the Saar and two-three-fold in the other states as compared to 
2014) might have mobilised the part of population that deems a further in-
crease in the number of foreign-born population inaccessible and is dissatis-
fied with the immigration policy of the ruling coalition. 
Subtypes B1, B2, and B3 differ in terms of socioeconomic development 
and migration situation. The B1 subtype states demonstrate the highest pro-
portion of foreign-born population (the only exception is the Rhineland-
Palatinate). These states traditionally attract many migrants and have a very 
low unemployment rate. The Saar, which comprises the B2 subtype, ranks 
second among all the states in terms of new arrivals per 1,000 population. At 
the same time, it has one of the lowest asylum seeker quotas. The B3 sub-
type brings together Germany’s largest states in terms of both area and popu-
lation, which have the highest asylum seeker quotas and the lowest concen-
tration of asylum seekers. 
Type C comprises three northern German states, most of whose popula-
tion do not share extreme right views on the migrant crisis. The electoral 
standing of the AfD party is rather low, with support ranging from 4 % to 
8 %. The party is poorly represented in the Landtage. In these regions, the 
refugee quota is very low and the unemployment rate is around 7.4 %, which 
is below the national average of 7.5 %. However, the party’s popularity is 
growing, which is explained by a slight — but still twofold — increase in the 
number of asylum seekers. 
It is possible to distinguish between the C1 and C2 subtypes, which dif-
fer in ethnic composition. The C1 states have a small proportion of foreign-
born population not exceeding 6—8 %. Therefore, a small inflow of refugees 
(4—5 persons per 1,000 population) was accepted by the local society. 
A significant increase in popular dissatisfaction can be provoked by low li-
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ving standards, since the regions’ GRP per capita is well below — by  
8—16 % — the national average. The C2 subtype comprises the rich city of 
Hamburg, whose GRP reaches the national maximum with 55.6 thousand 
euro per capita. The city has one of the highest shares of non-German popu-
lation standing at 15.2 %. The remarkable ethnic diversity observed over the 
past years could have contributed to rather tolerant attitudes to migrants. The 
support for extreme right views decreased threefold throughout 2016 — 
from 13 % in January to 4 % in November. 
 
Conclusions 
 
It seems that the migration shock currently experienced by Germany has 
affected all the systems of the receiving society and changed attitudes to 
immigrants and refugees. As a result, the German society is ready to revise 
its political views and make changes to the country’s political party system. 
The research shows that the proposed approach contributes to regional anal-
yses and provides a valuable supplement to the existing national and interna-
tional research as it studies the attitudes to immigration based on the elec-
toral preferences of Germans, namely, their support for extreme right players 
in the political space, who focus their campaigns on restrictive migration 
regulation. 
The proposed methodology for federal state typology has been tested and 
proved applicable to such studies, since it takes into account key factors af-
fecting popular attitudes to migrants and makes it possible to compare rela-
tive measures. The analysis of the effect of such factors on the growing pop-
ularity of extreme right views on immigration helped to identify patterns be-
hind the formation of negative attitudes to immigrants and refugees in cer-
tain German regions. For instance, the increasing support for extreme right 
views on the migrant crisis in the former GDR and the improving position of 
the radical AfD party in Landtage are largely explained by the significant 
rise in the number of asylum seekers, relatively low standards of living, and 
a high unemployment rate observed in such states. 
The commitment to the AfD’s anti-immigrant slogans is characteristic of 
states that have been experiencing a high migration load over a long time, 
namely the country’s southwest, and the cities of Berlin and Bremen. How-
ever, the authors understand that the effect of these factors is not permanent, 
nor is it unambiguous. Thus, the electoral standing of extreme right parties 
does not fully reflect the receiving society’s support for a restrictive migra-
tion policy. Indeed, a more detailed and comprehensive study into the re-
gional patterns behind the attitudes to immigrants must take into account ad-
ditional factors, such as the impact of migration on the sociocultural sphere 
of the receiving society and the criteria for assessing legislative proposals on 
immigration. 
Thus, the above typology of Germany’s states can be used in studying 
regional variations in the population’s support for extreme right views on the 
migrant crisis, as the migration and socioeconomic situation changes. The 
obtained results can be of interest in developing and implementing a ‘smart’ 
migration policy taking into account such regional variations. It is important 
to improve Germany’s current system of asylum seeker distribution to pre-
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vent a further increase in radical attitudes in selected regions. The asylum 
seeker quota must take into account the migration situation and the level of 
regional socioeconomic development. Even if the migration situation is kept 
at bay, it is important to take urgent measures to defuse tensions in the socie-
ty. This will require pursuing a consistent integration policy at regional and 
municipal levels and involving established diaspora groups and organisa-
tions. Turning a blind eye to adaptation and integration problems, especially 
during the current crisis, will lead to further radicalisation of attitudes to mi-
grants and thus affect the political sphere. 
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